本帖最后由 暨大考研论坛 于 2021-4-25 18:02 编辑
主 题：Why SEZs Succeed?——Evidences form Political Favoritism in China 主讲人：孙伟增副教授 （中央财经大学） 主持人：武文杰教授 会议时间：2021 年 4 月 29 日（周四）上午10:00-12:00 会议工具：腾讯会议（会议号：922 315 661）
摘 要:
Why do some Special Economic Zones (SEZs) succeed while others not? This question has not been well answered in the existing literature. Using a unique panel data of administrative officials of 266 SEZs and 582 firms in China from 2005 to 2018, we examine the role of political favoritism in the SEZ performance. The difference-in-differences (DID) estimate indicates that the total factor productivity (TFP) of firms in SEZs appointed with higher-level officials is about 13%-16% higher than the TFP of firms in normal SEZs. Higher-level officials mean stronger administrative powers, which can bring political favoritism to firms in their jurisdiction. Further analysis show that higher-level officials enable their firms to enjoy more preferential treatments in financing, credit, government subsidies, and administrative approvals, thus stimulating enterprise innovation. The results of our paper suggest that the success of SEZs in developing countries is related to strong administration, but this might build on the loss of surrounding areas.
★主讲人简介★
孙伟增，中央财经大学经济学院副教授、硕士生导师，中国房地产中青年学者30人论坛成员，上海交通大学住房与城乡建设研究中心特约研究员。研究领域包括城市经济学、区域经济学、房地产经济学等。在 Journal of Urban Economics, Regional Science and Urban Economics, Journal of Regional Science, 《中国社会科学》《经济研究》《管理世界》《经济学季刊》等国内外知名期刊发表论文40余篇。主持国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目、中央财经大学标志性科研成果培育项目。获得第五届洪银兴经济学奖（青年）、中央财经大学涌金教师学术奖、世界华人不动产学会年会最佳论文奖、亚洲房地产学会年会最佳论文奖等学术荣誉和奖励。
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